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Abstract. Mathematics is often taken to play one of two roles in the empirical sciences:
either it represents empirical phenomena, or it explains these phenomena by imposing
constraints on them. This paper identifies a third and distinct role which has not been fully
appreciated in the literature, and may be pervasive in scientific practice. I call this the
“bridging” role of mathematics, according to which mathematics acts as a connecting scheme
in our explanatory reasoning about why and how two different descriptions of an empirical
phenomenon relate to each other. I discuss two bridging roles appearing in biological and
physical explanations.
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1 Introduction
Some philosophers maintain that either mathematics is merely representational of the empirical
phenomena in scientific explanations, or it has a non-representational, constraining-explanatory
role. The former is uncontroversial. As an integral part of scientific explanations, mathematics
plays a significant role in idealized representations of the empirical world. In contemporary
literature this role is often analyzed in two ways: either by appealing to the so-called mapping
account of Pincock (2004, 2007), which suggests that there is some kind of structural
morphism between mathematics and the empirical world, or by the inferential account of
Bueno and Colyvan (2011) and Bueno and French (2018), which along with structural
morphism emphasizes pragmatic and context-dependent features in applying mathematics to
the empirical world.1
In contrast, some philosophers have promoted a genuinely explanatory role for mathematics
in the empirical sciences. In one of its promising versions, Lange (2012, 2017) argues that
mathematics can factor into explanations by constraining the empirical world. For instance, in
explaining why a mother cannot divide 23 whole strawberries evenly among her three children,
the mathematical fact that 23 cannot be divided evenly by 3 constrains her action and explains
her inability. There are certainly additional accounts of how mathematics might explain
physical phenomena, e.g., Batterman (2009), but I will primarily restrict myself to the
representational and Lange’s constraining accounts in order to keep this paper to a manageable
length. In section 3, however, some alternative accounts will be briefly mentioned.
1Earlier versions of Pincock’s (2004, 2007) view can be found in standard mathematics text-
books such as Stewart (2008, 24), and also in the classic work on measurement by Krantz et al.
(1971).
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Both of these views about the roles of mathematics, representing and constraining, have
much to recommend then, but as I will show, they are not exhaustive. In this paper, I identify a
third and distinct role which I will call the “bridging” role for mathematics in explanations.
According to this role, mathematics acts as a connecting scheme in our explanatory reasoning
about why and how two different descriptions of an empirical phenomenon relate to each other.
In section 2, I describe the representational and the constraining-explanatory roles of
mathematics. In section 3, I propose that the bridging role of mathematics is distinct from both
the representational and the constraining-explanatory roles. In support of my proposal, I
present a case study analyzing a scientific explanation of color pattern formation by
mathematical biologists. Subsequently, I show why Bueno and Colyvan’s (2011) and Bueno
and French’s (2018) framework for the applicability of mathematics cannot fully accommodate
the bridging role of mathematics in this explanation. Hence, I revise their framework to fulfill
this task. In section 4, I argue that the bridging role is general enough, and it is found in other
cases of explanation, one of which is a familiar historical example. In particular, I will discuss
how this role appeared in an explanation of why and how two variant descriptions of quantum
phenomena were found to have empirically-significant, mathematical equivalence. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 The Representational and Constraining-explanatory Roles
Advocates of the representational role of mathematics in explanations, such as Pincock (2004,
2007), Bueno and Colyvan (2011), and Bueno and French (2018) believe that mathematics
plays a role in empirical sciences in virtue of some structural morphism between an abstract,
formal structure and its appropriate empirical counterpart. The role of Euler’s theorem in
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explaining why no one can cross all the bridges of Ko¨nigsberg only once before returning to
their starting point is a classic example. The explanation bears on the specific configuration of
the bridges and paths that exhibit the structure of a non-Eulerian graph. The idea is that given
the topological structure of the actual bridges and our abstract mathematical knowledge about
the properties of Eulerian and non-Eulerian paths, we find a mapping relation between the
mathematical structure and the empirical phenomenon. It is exactly in virtue of this structural
mapping that mathematics becomes explanatory.
Pincock (2004, 2007) develops his mapping account according to the widespread view that
the applicability of mathematics to the empirical world is due to sharing some structural
similarity between mathematics and the empirical phenomenon of interest. The existence of
such structural similarity sufficiently accommodates the applicability of a given mathematical
structure to the empirical phenomenon.
Bueno and Colyvan (2011) and Bueno and French (2018, Chapter 2) introduce the
inferential account for the applicability of mathematics by expanding upon Pincock’s
structural-mapping account. Along with structural morphism, they incorporate some pragmatic
elements that are relevant to mathematical explanation and idealization, and are necessary for
the applicability of mathematics to the empirical world. The main claim of Bueno and Colyvan
(2011) and Bueno and French (2018) is that when certain features of the empirical world are
embedded into a mathematical structure, we can obtain inferences which might otherwise be
impossible (or at least, extremely difficult) to draw. This account proceeds in three steps: (i)
immersion: establishing a mapping between a mathematical structure M1 and a
characterization of an empirical phenomenon L1; (ii) derivation: drawing mathematical
consequences M2 from M1; (iii) interpretation: interpreting M2 back to a descriptive level of
the empirical phenomenon L2 by establishing some sort of mapping relation. Step (ii) is empty
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of pragmatic considerations; as Bueno and Colyvan (2011, 353) and Bueno and French (2018,
52–3) put it: “The second step consists in drawing consequences from the mathematical
formalism, using the mathematical structure obtained in the immersion step.” Hence, according
to the inferential framework, M2 is always a purely mathematical consequence of M1. On the
other hand, the steps (i) and (iii) encode some pragmatic and context-sensitive features, such as
what to map and interpret, in applying mathematics to the empirical world.2 This account is
illustrated in figure 1.
L1 M1
M2L2
immersion
drawing of consequences
interpretation
Figure 1: The inferential account.
In this paper, I am concerned with cases in which a given empirical phenomenon of interest
is characterized at two distinct descriptive levels L1 and L2. Understanding how and why the
two levels connect then would be a legitimate explanatory question. For each of the L1 and L2,
the mathematical representations M1 and M2 are distinctly obtained. Each representation
illustrates a mapping between a mathematical structure and the empirical phenomenon. To
explain why the two descriptive levels L1 and L2 connect, the characteristics of the relation
2In the rest of the paper, I only focus on Bueno and Colyvan’s (2011) and Bueno and French’s
(2018) representational account, as their account extends Pincock’s mapping account by incor-
porating pragmatic considerations.
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between the two mathematical representations M1 and M2 should be examined. The
exploration of why and how the two descriptive levels connect is especially interesting, because
the mathematical representations are limited to a particular scientific discourse,
mathematical/computational biology (section 3), and physics (section 4). In other words, the
investigation of the relationship between the two representations pertains to a specific group of
scientists. The second step of the inferential account, as illustrated in figure 1, provides
resources to capture the derivation of mathematical consequences M2 from the mathematical
representation M1. Although in some cases the link between the representations M1 and M2 is
explained in terms of consequence derivation, I will shortly discuss the shortcomings of step
(ii). I then propose how these shortcomings can be overcome by recognizing the bridging role
of mathematics.
Before I discuss my point further, I would briefly clarify why the bridging role of
mathematics is also distinct from the constraining-explanatory role. Defenders of the genuinely
constraining role such as Lange (2009, 2012, 2017) attribute a constraining strength to
mathematics. On this view, Euler’s theorem becomes explanatorily relevant, because it imposes
mathematical constraints on how things can be in the empirical world. Lange’s account, of
course, requires commitment to a particular relation among different constraining strengths;
mathematics being more constraining than the empirical laws of nature. Hence, Lange’s view
about the explanatory role of mathematics may be appealing to those who share his theory of
constraining strengths, but controversial to those who reject that theory. The bridging role of
mathematics, as I will discuss shortly, is compatible with this constraining-explanatory role, but
it does not need to be. The two examples presented in sections 3 and 4 primarily examine some
problems for the mapping and the inferential approaches. The reason that I have very briefly
mentioned Lange’s proposal, as a prominent exemplar for the explanatory role of mathematics,
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is to show that in addition to the bridging role proposed in this paper, there are other
philosophical views challenging the idea that mathematics merely plays a representational role
in scientific explanations. In other words, I aim to highlight that my proposal is not the only
one challenging the representational view.
In the rest of the paper, I provide two case studies to illustrate how the bridging role works
in scientific practice. In section 3, I discuss how mathematical biologists appeal to the bridging
role to explain the relation between a macro-level and a micro-level characterization of an
empirical phenomenon, namely the pattern formation on animal skins. I show how using new
parts of mathematics, independent from the mathematics employed for capturing the
similarities with the empirical phenomenon of interest, helps obtaining the micro-level
representation from the macro-level mathematical representation. In section 4, I illustrate the
bridging role of mathematics in explaining the empirical adequacy of two mathematical
representations of quantum phenomena. The two case studies reveal how obtaining
approximate representations, using bridging mathematical facts, is a very different activity
when compared to drawing of consequences as suggested in step (ii) of Bueno and Colyvan’s
(2011) and Bueno and French’s (2018) inferential framework. The examples discussed in
sections 3 and 4 show that the relation between the two mathematical representations is not
necessarily a consequence derivation. The relation in question can be an approximation relation
(section 3) or an equivalence relation (section 4). In both examples, without a mathematical
bridge, linking the two mathematical representations of the case studies seemed impossible.
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3 The Bridging Role of Mathematics at Work
In this section, I provide an example of a bridging role of mathematics in biology. Biological
phenomena such as the pattern formation of skin colors are often explained either functionally
or mechanistically. Mechanistic explanations work by identifying the mechanisms responsible
for the occurrence of the empirical phenomena (see Machamer et al. 2000). Biologists may
also appeal to some functional features such as sexual selection or camouflage to explain the
biological phenomena, but these functional explanations are beyond the scope of this paper.3
Mathematical biologists often explain the formation of the skin patterns of vertebrates by
appealing to Turing equation models to capture reaction-diffusion (RD) mechanisms between
biological cells. In his landmark paper, “The chemical basis of morphogenesis”, Turing (1952)
proposed a mechanistic explanation for the phenomenon of morphogenesis: the shapes in
living organisms are generated through the RD system.4 An RD system uses a set of nonlinear
3I am not dismissing the extremely important functional explanations of evolutionary biology.
Since in this paper I am interested in examining the roles of mathematics in explanations, I
focus here on the mechanistic explanations as a grounding for the higher-level explanation
of the phenomenon of interest: namely, why (from a mechanistic point of view) is there a
particular pattern formation on the skin color?
4In his paper, Turing was chiefly motivated to discuss a mechanism by which the genes of a
zygote may determine the anatomical structure of the resulting organism. His proposal was
later developed and mathematically elaborated upon, to explain the mechanism of the formation
of different skin patterns on animal skins by using the partial differential equations of the RD
mechanisms. These became later known as Turing equations. For a philosophical discussion of
this topic, see Kitcher (1999).
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continuous dynamical equations to represent the interactions between microscopic biological
cells. Hence, Turing models play a representational role in explaining why does this particular
skin color pattern occur? The models trace the activities and interactions between microscopic
biological cells involved in formation of the patterns in any self-regulated system with an
underpinning RD mechanism.
In the case of squamates (lizards and snakes), the interactions between different elements of
chromatophore cells result in the dynamic formation of skin color patterns.5 RD models then
calculate the concentration of the pigmentary and structural elements at a given time, based on
the substances’ diffusion, feed rate, removal rate, and reactions between them. More details
about the mathematics of the Turing patterns are provided in section 3.2.
In contrast to the Turing explanation, which appeals to the interactions among microscopic
biological skin cells, Manukyan et al. (2017) study a case according to which the full
explanation of the formation of the labyrinth color pattern on the skin of a species of lizard
requires more than the proposed Turing mechanism. Their study is the first in biological
research on the formation of animals’ skin color patterns proposing a different mathematical
model, that of a discrete cellular automaton, to that of Turing’s equations. They show that for a
species of lizard, known as the ocellated lizard, the macro-dynamics of the skin color pattern is
represented by the dynamics between the mesoscopic skin scales, rather than microscopic
biological cells.6 Mesoscopic skin scales are quasi-hexagons whose long diagonal is about
150–200 microns in a newborn individual, and about 1mm in an adult. Microscopic biological
5Chromatophore cells are prominent in animals including amphibians, fish, and reptiles. These
cells either contain pigments or reflect structures.
6Ocellated lizards (Timon lepidus) are primarily found in Southern Europe. The study is based
on the analysis of time series of ocellated lizards over four years.
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Figure 2: Change in the skin color patterns of ocellated lizards from Manukyan et al. (2017).
skin cells are typically 20 microns in size, and not visible to the naked eye.7 Figure 2 illustrates
the changes in skin color patterns of the ocellated lizards at multiple time points over about
three years, from juvenile (figure 2a) to adult (figure 2b).
Manukyan et al. (2017) claim that the units of the mesoscopic skin scale, rather than
microscopic biological cells, establish the pattern formation of skin color in ocellated lizards.
They show how the mesoscopic scale units can be modeled by a discrete cellular automaton
that generates color patterns at the macroscopic scale of the skin of ocellated lizards. This
seems to be fairly different to the Turing explanation according to which the microscopic skin
scales, rather than mesoscopic biological cells, establish the color pattern. In this context, a
natural puzzle for mathematical biologists arises: how can two distinct representations, the
Turing model and the cellular automaton model, capture the dynamics of a single empirical
phenomenon, the formation of color patterns on ocellated lizards? Take the explanandum as:
7I obtained the exact size of the different cell scales from Michel C. Milinkovitch, the leading
author of the paper.
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there are two distinct descriptions for the formation of patterns on the skin of ocellated lizards.
Before answering why this is the case, it is necessary to say a few words about the mathematics
of cellular automata.
3.1 Cellular Automaton Models as Higher-level Representations
Cellular automaton models, originally developed by Von Neumann (1951), offer a
mathematical characterization of the dynamics of various kinds of complex empirical and
natural phenomena (see Wolfram 1984; Toffoli 1984; Langton 1986; Ermentrout and
Edelstein-Keshet 1993 for an overview and examples). Roughly speaking, cellular automata
are composed of a set of units (grids of elements) spanned over an (n-dimensional) spatial
structure. At time t1, for a given cellular automaton, each unit is in a state σi from a set Σ of
finitely many possible states. Each unit can only interact with units in its neighborhood,
according to a set R, composed of deterministic or probabilistic rules. These rules specify how
the state of a unit should change based on the structure of the states of its local neighbors.
Time-steps in cellular automata are discretely incremented. At each incremental time-step
t2, t3, · · · , tn, unit states are organized according to the instructions of R relative to their local
neighbors. The organization of the unit states continues by iterating on the set R. From these
local interactions, a cellular automaton evolves into different kinds of macro-patterns over the
whole spatial structure. The diachronic aggregation of the cellular automaton instructions for
the state change of units of a grid gives rise to the emergence of various complex patterns at a
macro-level.
Take the units of the cellular automaton to be the mesoscopic hexagon skin scales. The
pattern formation of the skin color of ocellated lizards is generated by changes in influence
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dynamics of the quasi-hexagonal units of a probabilistic cellular automaton model. Consider
the ocellated lizard skin as a spatially expanded grid of units, each element being a mesoscopic
scale unit of skin. The set of states for the units of this cellular automaton are two colors, green
and black. At birth, ocellated lizards have brown skin with white polka dots spread over it (as
shown in figure 2). Within a few months, the skin pattern turns into arrays of black and green
units; and the color pattern grows over their skin according to the dynamic computation of the
color states of individual mesoscopic skin scales until the lizards reach the age of sexual
maturity. During transition from juvenile to adult patterns, the skin color units flip between
green and black according to some probabilistic rules over the quasi-hexagonal lattice of skin
scales.
The color of the mesoscopic skin scales switches depending on the colors of the
neighboring units. The general rules are as follows: with a very high probability, green units
tend to exhibit four black and two adjacent green units; with a very high probability, black units
tend to exhibit three green and three neighboring black units.8 Hence, formation of the skin
color pattern on ocellated lizards invokes an appeal to cellular automaton models and
mesoscopic skin units. This seems to be fairly different from the micro-level Turing
explanation of the pattern formation in which microscopic biological cells, rather than the
mesoscopic skin units, establish the pattern formation of skin color in ocellated lizards. The
following question with respect to the formation of skin patterns arises: how does this cellular
automaton pattern relate to the theoretical Turing explanation in mathematical biology? To
answer, first let us briefly look at Turing models.
8The probabilistic distributions of the color transition rules for this cellular automaton model are
derived from discrete RD numerical simulations.
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3.2 Turing Models as Lower-level Representations
In “The chemical basis of morphogenesis”, Turing (1952) proposed a mechanistic explanation
of morphogenesis in terms of RD systems. His main idea was that the formation of spatial
patterns in living organisms can happen by interaction between two substances with different
spreading rates. Turing showed that in certain systems, a homogeneous steady state is indeed
unstable, and any small local deviation from this steady state (i.e., diffusion) is sufficient to
trigger the beginning of pattern formation. Assume we only have two substances in a finite
domain: activators, which produce more of themselves; and inhibitors, which slow down the
production of activators. Diffusion as a stabilizing mechanism balances the amount of each.
The dynamic formation of skin color patterns in vertebrates such as zebrafish is known to
be the result of microscopic non-linear interactions among pigment cells that obey the Turing
equations.9 It is shown that a set of nonlinear partial differential equations gives a mechanistic
explanation for the color pattern formation of zebrafish (Nakamasu et al. 2009). These
equations reveal that only two types of choromatophore cells (melanophores and xanthophores)
dominate the biological process of pattern formation. Manukyan et al. (2017) adapt this set of
equations to formulate the color pattern formation on the skin of ocellated lizards. Consider the
two variables u and v representing the densities of two kinds of pigment cells, melanophore and
xanthophore, respectively; w representing a long-range factor of diffusion; F ,G,H representing
interactions among the chromatophore cells; cu, cv, and cw representing the coefficients for the
decay processes; Du∇2u, Dv∇2v, and Dw∇2w representing diffusion processes (Du is the
9The micro-scale Turing explanation for such pattern formation is an approximation of the sus-
tained micro-scale non-equilibrium dissipation, involving short- and long-range interactions
among biological cells.
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diffusion coeffiecient and∇2u is the Laplacian).10 The following system of partial differential
equations gives the two-dimensional representation of the skin color patterns of zebrafish:11
∂u
∂t
= F (u, v, w)− cuu+Du∇2u , ∂v
∂t
= G(u, v, w)− cvv +Dv∇2v
∂w
∂t
= H(u, v, w)− cww +Dw∇2w
Call the micro-level description of the color pattern formation L1 and these Turing models
representing this descriptive level M1. M2 (as discussed in section 3.1.), is a discrete cellular
automaton model representing the macroscopic pattern formation of the skin colors by
referring to the mesoscopic skin scale units. Hence, there are two different kinds of models M1
and M2, at two different representational levels. But how can we get from the micro-level, the
Turing model, to the macro-level, the cellular automaton representation? Why are there two
very different representations for the same empirical phenomenon, the color pattern formation?
How do these two representations relate?
To explain why the cellular automaton pattern is a plausible mathematical representation of
the skin color pattern, we need to understand how the microscopic interactions among the
biological cells translate into a cellular automaton pattern.
3.3 From Turing Models to Cellular Automaton Patterns
The case study presents the following explanatory gap: Given that pattern formation at the
micro-level of biological cells can be represented by a set of differential equations, how can we
10The decay terms model cell behaviors such as division, differentiation, and death. The values
of cu, cv, cw parameters are based on Nakamasu’s model.
11The authors also consider boundary conditions on the functions F,G,H to avoid any unreal-
istic production rate of the substances.
14
explain the formation of cellular automaton patterns on the macro-level of the skin? Scientific
intuition says there should be a way to fill this gap. To confirm this intuition in a stable and
reliable way, Manukyan et al. (2017) appeal to a set of mathematical facts. To obtain the
discrete RD models from the continuous ones requires considering the dual correspondence
between Voronoi diagrams and Delaunay triangulation.12 Only after adding this duality fact to
mathematical knowledge about continuous RD models, obtaining discrete RD models became
possible. This duality is the bridge principle at work.
First, to obtain the discrete RD equations, Manukyan et al. (2017) approximate the
continuous RD equations by discretization to edges of a square lattice (with edge length equal
to S and a sufficiently small edge width ). Discretization is such that the RD equations are
essentially unchanged, with the same coefficients. The only difference with the continuous RD
equations is the replacement of the Laplacian∇2u(x) by its discrete counterpart:∑
x′ [u(x
′)− u(x)], where x′ is the neighbor of x. The diffusion coefficient Du is replaced by a
factor of −2Du. Continuous RD equations on a Voronoi diagram approximate the lizard skin
scales. Discrete RD equations on Delaunay triangulation are then obtained from the continuous
RD equations. Consider z denoting the center of a hexagon, and z′ denoting the centers of the
adjacent hexagons. The discrete Laplacian on the Delaunay triangulation becomes: ∇2U(z) =∑
z′ [U(z
′)− U(z)].13 Then, they show that functions U, V,W approximately satisfy the
12For a given set of discrete points P in a plane, a Delaunay triangulation is a triangulation such
that no point of the given set is inside the circumcircle of any triangle obtained. A Voronoi
diagram is a partitioning of a plane into regions based on distance to points P in a specific
subset of the plane.
13U, V,W at the center z of a hexagon are defined as the averages corresponding to u, v, w on
the vertices of the square lattice inside a hexagon.
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discrete RD equations on the Delaunay triangulation. The bridge principle, the mathematical
fact concerning the transformation of the continuous RD equations on a Voronoi diagram to the
discrete RD equations on the corresponding Delaunay triangulation, provides a sufficiency
condition for obtaining the discrete RD equations from the continuous ones. Figure 3 illustrates
this dual correspondence.
This example shows that the drawing of consequence step of the inferential framework is
too simplistic to straightforwardly capture how some scientists such as Manukyan et al. (2017)
use some pieces of mathematics, independent from any mathematical representations M1 and
M2, to explain the link between the two different descriptions of an empirical phenomenon.
Obtaining the discrete RD model from the continuous one is not just drawing consequences, in
the sense of Bueno and Colyvan (2011, 353) and Bueno and French (2018, 52–53):
The second step consists in drawing consequences from the mathematical
formalism, using the mathematical structure obtained in the immersion step. We
call this step derivation. This is, of course, the key point of the application process,
where consequences from the mathematical formalism are generated.
In the case study presented, it is epistemically impossible to obtain the discrete RD model
without adding a new mathematical fact, the duality between Voronoi diagram and Delaunay
triangulation, to the toolbox of scientists. The approximated RD models, therefore, are not
simply the result of drawing mathematical consequences from the mathematical representation
obtained in the immersion step (i.e., the continuous Turing equations). Here, an approximation
procedure is at work. Why this approximation, rather than another? Because the scientists have
the discrete cellular automaton model and want to link that discrete model to the continuous
Turing equations in order to improve their understanding of the biological phenomena.
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One main reason is that manipulating formulas and directly drawing mathematical
consequences does not always show what the scientists aim to explain. To connect these
representations, something else, a previously unrelated piece of mathematics, is required. I call
this piece a mathematical bridge. A mathematical bridge provides sufficient conditions that
make obtaining a different mathematical representation of the same empirical phenomenon
possible.14 The derivation step of Bueno and Colyvan (2011) and Bueno and French (2018)
merely shows that a mathematical structure is a mathematical consequence of another. The
case study illustrates that we cannot merely derive M2 from M1; rather, we need an additional
fact, the mathematical bridge, that makes obtaining the M2 possible. Therefore, the bridge is
explanatory because it answers why and how the two descriptive levels of an empirical
phenomenon connect.
In contrast to the drawing of consequences step of the inferential account, sometimes the
scientific aim is not merely drawing mathematical consequences, and then to interpret these
consequences back to a micro-level description of the phenomenon L2. In some situations, we
have two mathematical representations from two distinct kinds of scientific study, and then the
main goal is to explain how one given mathematical representation links to another, and
accordingly how the two descriptions of the empirical phenomenon under study relate. The
second mathematical representation gives some hints as to what kinds of approximations we
need in order to justify the link. These hints incorporate some pragmatic and occasionally
messy and context-dependent considerations that motivate scientists’ search for mathematical
bridges.
14I do not claim that this mathematical piece is unique. In principle, there might be other ways
to explain the link between the two descriptions of the empirical phenomenon. Nothing I say
here rules out such alternatives.
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Figure 3: Voronoi tiling diagrams and Delaunay triangulation from Manukyan et al. (2017).
Obtaining the discrete RD model from the continuous one mathematically confirms
biological intuitions of scientists about the presence of some new geometrical parameters at
work responsible for the appearance of macroscopic cellular automaton patterns. Scientists
then interpret the new parameters in the following way: the generation of the discrete RD
mechanism is due to the dramatic difference of thickness between scale and inter-scale skin of
the ocellated lizards.
Having the discrete RD models, Manukyan et al. (2017) then show that the cellular
automaton behavior can be obtained when the diffusion coefficients in the system of discrete
partial differential equations are reduced by a factor greater than 80% in the inter-scale regions.
This approximation is validated with the help of computer simulations: that the discrete RD
model and the cellular automaton have the same statistical properties.15 I have now enough
15Understanding how computer simulations factor into scientific explanations is beyond the
scope of this paper. Interested readers are referred to Dura´n (2017) and Parker (2017) for
some initial insights. The use of computer simulations in obtaining M2 from M1 additionally
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pieces at hand to revise the schema of the inferential account. This revised account is illustrated
in figure 4.
L1 M1
M2
B
L2
immersion
approximation
interpretation
Figure 4: Bridging role of mathematics in inter-level explanation of color pattern formation.
In figure 4, the continuous RD model M1 represents the mechanisms of the biological skin
cells at the micro-level L1. The macro-level skin pattern L2 is represented by a cellular
automaton model M2. Scientists require some bridge principles to make sense of the relation
between M2 and M1. In particular, M2 cannot be derived from M1 alone. To obtain M2
requires a mathematical principle whose relation to M1 and M2 was previously unknown and
which is not entailed by M1. This bridging principle is the mathematical fact that Voronoi
diagrams and Delaunay triangulations are dual (B). B is used in scientists’ attempt to close the
explanatory gap between the two descriptive levels of the empirical phenomenon of interest. B
provides mathematical possibility for obtaining M2 from M1. The crucial point to stress here is
that what I am calling the bridge principle, is independent from either of the two models M1 or
M2. Bueno and Colyvan (2011) and Bueno and French (2018), for instance, might want to say
that M2 is merely an extension of M1 and is easily understood in terms of their partial models.
challenges the claim that the derivation step (ii) of figure 1 is sufficient to explain the role of
mathematics in the present case study.
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However, this is not the case because the bridge principle B here, which is independent from
either of the two models M1 or M2, is essential to relate them. Finding a relevant mathematical
bridge can sometime be a significant achievement. Hence, the step (ii) of the inferential
account, drawing of consequences, should be replaced by an approximation step which allows
to choose a bridge principle and an approximation procedure.
The schema illustrated in figure 4 has the maximum amount of apparatus to capture the
roles of mathematics in some explanations. Needless to say, not all steps illustrated here might
manifest themselves in different instances of the applicability of mathematics to empirical
phenomena. The revised schema captures the use of mathematical bridges in obtaining new
mathematical representations. Moreover, it illustrates that in some cases, due to extreme levels
of difficulty or the epistemic impossibility of drawing consequences from a mathematical
formalism, approximation procedures substitute the strict mathematical derivation. In some
simple cases, the approximation might be sharpened and become purely mathematical in terms
of drawing of consequences; though it need not be the case. Hence, the schema presented in
figure 4 is broader than the inferential account of Bueno and Colyvan (2011) and Bueno and
French (2018).
Let me clarify a potential objection as to whether the revised schema in figure 4 is
something that Bueno and Colyvan’s (2011) and Bueno and French’s (2018) framework cannot
account for. Bueno and French (2018, Chapter 9) discuss how their account can accommodate
highly idealized models such as renormalization group techniques that are claimed to play a
genuine non-representational role in the explanation of phase transitions. Why do they play a
non-representational role? In one of the most promising responses, Batterman (2009) claims
that there is no correspondence between physical structures and divergent limits; hence, no
structural similarity can relate the physical world to the mathematical model. To handle this
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non-representational role of mathematics, Bueno and French’s (2018) solution is to keep the
step (ii) drawing of consequences fixed. Instead, they extend the step (i) and (iii) of their
account, the immersion and the interpretation steps, to iterated immersion and iterated
interpretation steps (figure 5). This means that, as they claim, sometimes in order to make sense
of the applicability of mathematics, first, there is a mapping between the physical structure and
the mathematical structure; then, there is a second immersion step from the mathematical
structure to another mathematical structure. In a similar vein, iterated interpretations happen in
order to map the mathematical representation back to the empirical world. In this way, Bueno
and French (2018) claim that their account can accommodate the non-representational role of
infinite limits when they apply to the empirical phenomenon of phase transition. Could it be
that this iterated inferential account also can capture the applicability of mathematics in the
case of the skin color pattern example? Not so for two reasons.
L1 M
′
1 M1
M2M
′
2L2
immersion 1 immersion 2
drawing of consequences
interpretation 2interpretation 1
Figure 5: The iterated inferential account.
First, by their own definition, the immersion and the interpretation steps should capture the
similarities between the physical and the mathematical phenomena. It is in virtue of this
physical-mathematical similarity that the inferential conception of applied mathematics gets off
the ground. However, establishing a relation between the two mathematical structures M ′1 and
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M1 is not really an immersion step, in the same way that the relation between L1 and M ′1 is.
The structural similarity between M ′1 and M1 is purely mathematical, not
physical-mathematical. As a result, the relation between M ′1 and M1 is not really immersion. In
a similar vein, the relation between the two mathematical structures M ′2 and M2 is not really an
interpretation step. The structural similarity between M ′2 and M2 is purely mathematical, not
physical-mathematical. This is an objection as to whether the iterated inferential account really
gets off the ground. Second, the iterated account does not open space for considerations of
bringing new parts of mathematics to the mathematical toolbox of scientist for the explanations
in question. In particular, it does not show the role of independent parts of mathematics when
they make relating the two mathematical representations M1 and M2 possible.
The bridging role of mathematics as an explanatory role is compatible with a variety of
ontological stances about mathematics. Here, I explore two major ontological views. Both
views are committed to assigning a high status to the contribution of mathematics to scientific
reasoning. First, at least partially, mathematics is embedded in and therefore constitutive of the
empirical world (e.g., Bigelow 1988; Franklin 2014). If this is the case, scientific intuitions
about the existence of a mathematical relation between the mechanistic explanations of the two
levels is confirmed by mathematical bridges that are constitutive of the empirical world.
Second, the mathematical bridges act as a piece of puzzle-filling in our incomplete schema of
scientific reasoning. This view assigns a more instrumental, functional stance to mathematics.
Relatedly, we might also expect that we will find a natural correspondence with the
mathematical bridge in the future, as current scientific knowledge is evolving and by no means
complete.
To summarize, first, in the study of the color pattern formation of vertebrates, mathematical
biologists use continuous differential equations as a mathematical model for the representation
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of the interactions and activities among microscopic biological cells. In the formation of color
patterns, a Turing model provides a mechanistic explanation for “why is there a specific kind of
skin color pattern with reference to microscopic biological cells?” Second, a cellular
automaton model is used to represent the formation of the color pattern at the macroscopic
level, by making reference to the mesoscopic hexagonal cells. Third, the mathematical fact that
Voronoi diagrams and Delaunay triangulations are dual acts as a bridge to obtain discrete RD
models in explaining “why is there a cellular automaton model at the macro-level of the target
phenomenon, given that the micro-dynamics between the biological skin cells correspond to a
Turing model?” Without digging into some facts of mathematical geometry, the scientists could
not unequivocally characterize the system, could not justify the presence of “an additional
spatial parameter”, and could not fully explain why we obtain the cellular automaton patterns
from the continuous Turing models. Therefore, the bridging role of mathematics is an
important role for mathematics in scientific explanations.
In the next section, I briefly discuss another interesting case from the history of science in
which a mathematical bridge has made explaining the empirical adequacy of two mathematical
representations possible. I will discuss the explanation of the empirically-significant,
mathematical equivalence of matrix and wave mechanics as established by Von Neumann
(1955). I have two reasons to discuss this case. First, Bueno and French (2018, Chapter 6)
explore the exact same scientific case. Their discussion illustrates how mathematics unifies
some apparently unrelated domains, such as quantum states, probability assignments, and
logical inference. As I will argue, however, their discussion lacks sufficient resources to
accommodate the essential role of the mathematical bridge, the Riesz-Fischer theorem in
functional analysis, in establishing the empirically-significant, mathematical equivalence of
matrix mechanics and wave mechanics. Second, this example will be known, at least in outline,
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to many readers. The details will nicely illustrate the mathematical bridge to relate the two
mathematical models of quantum mechanics.
4 Bridging Wave Mechanics and Matrix Mechanics
Matrix mechanics is an algebraic approach, employing the techniques of matrix manipulation,
for the representation of observable properties of quantum systems, such as position and
momentum. Developed by Heisenberg (1925) and Born et al. (1926), matrix mechanics aims at
providing a mathematical representation for quantum systems, that is as closely as possible to
the mathematical formulations of classical mechanics; we must learn as much as possible about
the behavior of quantum systems from the behavior of the Hamiltonian function. Matrix
mechanics is articulated in a discrete space, and roughly assumes the following mathematical
postulates for the representation of quantum phenomena. (1) The observable behavior of a
quantum system, its position and its momentum, corresponds to time-dependent, Hermitian
matrices Q and P, known as canonical matrices. (2) The canonical matrices satisfy the
following quantum condition: PQ−QP = h
2pii
I . (3) Equations of motions are Q˙ = ∂H
∂P
and
P˙ = −∂H
∂Q
. (4) The Hamiltonian matrix W = H(Q1, . . . , Qk, P1, . . . , Pk,) that represents
energy is diagonal; otherwise, a canonical transformation matrix S should be found such that
S−1HS is diagonal. Finding solutions of quantum mechanical systems to the above
representation has turned out to be complicated.
From an entirely different standing point, Schro¨dinger (1926a) used the mathematical
machinery of differential equations, and developed wave mechanics to represent quantum
systems. Wave mechanics has an underlying continuous space, and treats material particles as
waves. A wave function ψ(x) is associated with each particle, and describes the shape of the
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wave in three-dimensional Euclidean space. Wave mechanics, broadly, assumes the following
mathematical postulates for the representation of quantum phenomena. (1) The position and
momentum of a quantum phenomenon are represented by a wave operator, acting on the
corresponding wave function. (2) Schro¨dinger’s equation H˜ψ = Eψ replaces the classical
equation of motion. H˜ is obtained by substitution of q and p in the classical Hamiltonian by the
following two operators: Q˜ = x and P˜ = −ih¯ ∂
∂x
. The main wave-mechanical problem is then
solving the partial differential equations.
As briefly shown above, these two representations of the quantum phenomena use very
different mathematical apparatuses to illustrate quantum reality: matrix mechanics describes
the quantum phenomena by discrete matrices and sums, whereas wave mechanics applies
continuous functions and integration over those functions for this representation. Take the
explanandum to be matrix and wave mechanics give empirically-significant,
mathematically-equivalent representations of the quantum phenomena. The explanans is the
mathematical proof that shows the empirically-significant, mathematical equivalence of these
two representations. Schro¨dinger (1926b) aimed to show that the two mathematical
representations of quantum phenomena, the wave and the matrix mechanics, were empirically
equivalent.16 He wanted to show that the empirical equivalence can be explained in terms of a
mathematical proof for the equivalence between the two mathematical representations.
Schro¨dinger himself was not fully successful in achieving this goal, due to several conceptual
and technical difficulties.17
16Around the same time, Eckart and Pauli also attempted to give similar equivalence proofs. I
will not discuss this point in further details here, as Schro¨dinger’s proof is the most elaborate
one, with the highest historical influence.
17For a detailed characterization of this debate, see Muller (1997a) and Muller (1997b).
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On the other hand, using his Hilbert space formalism, Von Neumann (1955) characterized
matrix mechanics with the totality of functions Fm, satisfying certain conditions. Fm constructs
the discrete space of matrix mechanics. In a similar vein, he identified the totality of functions
Fw, satisfying certain conditions. Fw constructs the continuous space of Schro¨dinger’s wave
mechanics. Then, he appealed to the Riesz-Fischer theorem in functional analysis to give the
proof for the isometric isomorphism of Fm and Fw. Fm and Fw are not arbitrary sets of
functions. Indeed, Von Neumann (1955, pp. 30–31) emphasizes the empirical significance of
Fm and Fw as follows: (i) these functions “... are the entities which enter most essentially into
the problems of quantum mechanics”, and (ii) they “... are the real analytical substrata of the
matrix and wave theories.” (i) and (ii) gives sufficient reasons to von Neumann to claim that “...
this isomorphism must always yield the same numerical results.” Therefore, the mathematical
proof relates to making claims about the quantum phenomena. To put it differently, von
Neumann gave a mathematical proof for the equivalence of wave and matrix mechanics which
has empirical significance; that is, the mathematical equivalence of matrix and wave
representations of quantum phenomena is understood in terms of the same numerical results
that they provide. This empirical significance can be captured as follows: von Neumann’s
mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics describes the states of the physical system by
Hilbert space vectors and the measurable quantities by Hermitian operators.
As Bueno and French (2018, Chapter 6) point out, von Neumann’s mathematical proof of
the theoretical equivalence of matrix and wave mechanics reveals how appropriate analogies
and structural similarities between the two mathematical representations of quantum
phenomena gave rise to the development of a more general framework, von Neumann’s Hilbert
space formalism. Bueno and French successfully show that their three-step representational
framework captures the significance of structural similarities between the two mathematical
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Figure 6: Bridging role of mathematics in explaining the equivalence of matrix and wave me-
chanics.
representations, and how such similarities motivated mathematicians to find a more general
framework that unifies seemingly separate pieces of mathematics and logic. However, this
framework does not have sufficient resources to reveal how a new piece of mathematics made
the equivalence proof possible. Recall that their representational framework is composed of
three steps: immersion, drawing of consequences, and interpretation. I maintain that the
drawing of consequences cannot completely capture the role of mathematics in this quantum
endeavour. Indeed, von Neumann did not claim that Fm is obtained by a mathematical
derivation from Fw, nor that Fw is obtained by a consequence derivation from Fm. He used a
new piece of mathematics from functional analysis, the Riesz-Fischer theorem, to give the
proof of an empirically-significant, mathematical equivalence relation. I take the Riesz-Fischer
theorem to be a mathematical bridge. The drawing of consequence step of Bueno and
Colyvan’s (2011) and Bueno and French’s (2018) representational framework does not have
sufficient resources to show how this mathematical bridge, independent from the two
representations, makes the equivalence proof possible, since it requires bringing in outside
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considerations such as the Riesz-Fischer theorem from functional analysis. The importance of
adding the bridge is that sometimes it changes the nature of the activity of drawing
consequences. Figure 6 illustrates how the bridging role of mathematics (B) influences the
explanation of the empirically-significant, mathematical equivalence of wave mechanics (WM)
and matrix mechanics (MM) for a quantum system (QS). I want to stress once again a central
point. The representational account does a fine job of modeling matrix mechanics and wave
mechanics. But this account does not have sufficient resources to link the two, at least not
directly. The mathematical bridge was provided by a further mathematical domain that had
been perhaps known to some mathematicians but not to the physicists who eventually embraced
it as a bridge. It might even have been a new mathematical approach whose development was
in itself a mathematical achievement. In either case, it was not a mere corollary of the
mathematical formalism used for the representation of the empirical phenomenon.
In summary, some mathematical bridges will be evident to the scientists working on the
problem. Others might not be known to the scientists in question. They might have to consult
their friendly neighborhood mathematician for suggestions. The mathematical contribution of
Stanislav Smirnov, a Field medalist and a co-author of Manukyan et al. (2017), to the group of
biologists is a clear example. He put insights about the dual relation between Voronoi diagrams
and Delaunay triangulations on the table and so made possible the explanation of how and why
the two representations (one in terms of differential equations and the other in terms of cellular
automata) link. There is also the possibility that there is no bridge known to anyone. The
bridge has yet to be discovered or invented. This was von Neumann’s case. He had to come up
with a new piece of mathematics to explain why and how two very different mathematical
representations of quantum phenomena show empirically-significant, mathematical
equivalence.
28
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have identified a distinct role for mathematics in scientific explanations, the
bridging role, which has not been fully appreciated in the literature. This role illustrates how
mathematics acts as a reliable connecting scheme in our explanatory reasoning about different
representations of an empirical phenomenon. Different kinds of mathematical bridges are
possible. A bridge might connect different levels of empirical phenomena (as in the biological
case) or it might establish the equivalence of phenomena (as in the quantum mechanics case).
Still others might be possible.
Moreover, I have discussed that this bridging role differs from both the genuinely
constraining-explanatory role and the representational role. By providing two relevant case
studies from mathematical biology and physics, I have argued how this role is not a trivial
extension of Bueno and Colyvan’s (2011) and Bueno and French’s (2018) framework for the
applicability of mathematics to empirical phenomena. I have shown that adding a bridge
principle as an explanans provides sufficient conditions for making some approximations
possible. Accordingly, I have proposed revised schema that captures some instances of
scientific practice more accurately, and helps us to better understand the full spectrum of
activities that constitute applied mathematics.
Once alerted to examples of mathematical bridges and to examples where they might fail,
we will likely find lots more. For instance, the equivalence of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
mechanics comes to mind. Interesting questions will arise such as: How are they related? Are
they really equivalent? If so, what kind of roles mathematics play in establishing this
equivalence? If not, as North (2009) and Curiel (2013) argue, what weaker relation is at work
between the two mathematical representations? Perhaps, equivalence is a strong kind of
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relation and other kinds of relations worth analyzing. And some of these questions might only
be answered following considerable historical investigation. It could be that the idea of
mathematical bridges will open up a large and important new field for philosophical
investigation.
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